

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

OF MICHIGAN

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-NINTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 13 August 1968, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES
Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Mr. J. NOGUEIRA FILHO

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Burma:

U PE MYINT AUNG

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL
Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Mr. A. BERNIER

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA
Mr. R. KLEIN
Mr. J. STRUCKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

India:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
Mr. N. KRISHNAN
Mr. K.P. JAIN
Mr. O.N. SHEOPURI

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCILO
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI
Mr. R. BERLENGHI

Mexico:

Mr. J. CASTANEDA
Mr. H. CARDENAS RODRIGUEZ

Nigeria:

Alhaji SULE KOLO
Mr. L.A. MALIKI

Poland:

Mr. H. JAROSZEK

Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI

Mr. H. STEPOSZ

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO

Mr. O. IONESCO

Mr. V. TARZIORU

Mr. C. MITRAN

Sweden:

Mr. A. EDELSTAM

Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. KOSCHCHIN

Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV

Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

Mr. M.P. SHELEPIN

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF

Mr. O. SIRRY

Mr. A.R. ELREEDY

Mr. Y. RIZK

United Kingdom:

Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY

Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

United States of America:

Mr. G. BUNN

Mr. C. GLEYSTEN

Mr. C.G. BREAM

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I declare open the 389th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. HUSAIN (India): The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which has been occupied almost exclusively for almost two years with an important issue, has now reconvened for another session of its work to deal with other important matters at the point at which they were left in 1966, as well as to consider new issues which have arisen since then.

3. As we are all aware, the Committee is required to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-third session on: the progress achieved on the question of general and complete disarmament, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2342 B (XXII) (ENDC/210); the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2343 (XXII) (ibid.); the question of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2289 (XXII) (ibid.); the question of the elimination of foreign military bases, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2344 (XXII) (ibid.); and last but not least, action on resolution 2373 (XXII) of the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly, which, in addition to calling for negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, requested -

"... the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the nuclear-weapon States urgently to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament ..." (ENDC/226*)

4. Besides those tasks assigned to the Committee by the General Assembly, we have before us also proposals contained in the Soviet memorandum (ENDC/227) and the message of President Johnson (ENDC/228). Further, during our present deliberations we have listened with great interest and attention to the various proposals put forward by other delegations, including certain specific suggestions made by the delegations of the United Kingdom and Sweden.

(Mr. Husain, India)

5. Thus the Committee undoubtedly has a vast and impressive field of work. My delegation shares the view expressed by a number of delegations that, if we hope to achieve any significant and rapid progress in our work, and especially if we are to submit anything concrete and substantial to the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, it is essential that we concentrate our efforts on items which are relatively urgent and which, taking into account the present international situation, hold out the greatest measure of hope of agreement. Therefore we should without any further delay define the areas in which negotiations should take place in the immediate future.

6. We should bear in mind, while considering the question of the agenda of the Committee, the basic objectives of this Committee as laid down in General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI) which endorsed the establishment of this Committee. That resolution called upon the Committee to undertake as a matter of the utmost urgency negotiations, on the basis of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5), on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control -- a goal established by the international community under the historic General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV). The General Assembly laid down that until the goal of total disarmament was achieved, and without prejudicing progress towards that goal, the Committee should endeavour to reach agreements on other measures of disarmament, which have been variously termed collateral or partial measures of disarmament.

7. The work this Committee began in 1962 on the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament could not proceed beyond the stage of agreement on the preamble and the first four articles; and even this agreement was subject to certain reservations from both the Soviet Union and the United States. An attempt to resolve differences on certain basic problems of disarmament could not succeed either; and the discussions on the question of the reduction and elimination of nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles remained inconclusive. Since 1964 no negotiations have been undertaken in the Committee with a view to drafting a treaty on general and complete disarmament. If the world community is not to be disillusioned about the goal it has set itself, to live on a disarmed planet, the Committee must not lose sight of the main task assigned to it. The Committee must pick up the threads at the point

where it left off in 1964. Perhaps this task could be facilitated if the Soviet Union and the United States submitted revised versions of their draft treaties, which were presented in 1962 (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1; ENDC/30).

8. In this context it is a very welcome development that the United States and the Soviet Union have reached an agreement to have bilateral discussions on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. Even as early as 1957 India was of the view that it was simpler to deal with carriers than with nuclear weapons and that, if delivery vehicles were eliminated, the nuclear-weapon capacity for harm would be greatly reduced. In a further comment on our proposal to deal urgently with the problem of nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles, the late Prime Minister Nehru stated in 1960:

"We have been talking for a long time about the actual destruction of atomic bombs and the rest. It may be remembered that some time ago a suggestion was made in the United Nations Disarmament Commission on behalf of India in regard to these carriers of atomic weapons. It is simpler to deal with the carriers than with the weapons. Remove the carriers and we reduce very greatly the capacity for harm being done by atomic weapons. We take away the surprise element from it."

9. We therefore share the views expressed by several delegations here that the successful conclusion of the proposed bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union would greatly facilitate the effective stopping of the nuclear arms race, which despite the growing concern of the world has, as we all know, shown no signs of abatement. Indeed, with the further sophistication of offensive missile systems equipped with MIRVs, decoys and penetration aids, and the development and deployment of the ABM systems, the nuclear arms race is entering a new and more dangerous phase resulting in growing anxiety and unease for the entire world community. It is hoped, therefore, that the proposed bilateral discussions will take place in the near future and will be fruitful.

10. As regards collateral measures of disarmament, the highest priority must naturally go to measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. Among these the most important, as the Indian delegation has stressed repeatedly in the past, is a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. This would be the

most significant step towards a complete stoppage of the production of nuclear weapons. There could be no justification whatsoever for any addition to the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, which already have the capacity to destroy the world several times over. As has been rightly observed by certain other delegations also, the difficulty of verification of a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes can no longer be cited as a reason for not reaching an agreement on this measure, since an agreement on control already exists and the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States in respect of inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could be made the same as those of the States not having nuclear weapons. An agreement on a cut-off in the further production of nuclear weapons should therefore be concluded as soon as possible.

11. Among other measures in the field of nuclear disarmament the Government of India has always attached the highest importance to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. My delegation would earnestly suggest that intensive negotiations on this question should take place in the Committee in the immediate future. Both the need for and the urgency of achieving "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" is underlined in the undertaking given in the Moscow test-ban Treaty by the three nuclear-weapon Powers (ENDC/100/Rev.1). No progress has, however, been made in this direction during the last five years, which have, on the other hand, been marked by an increasing frequency of nuclear explosions. The General Assembly has accorded a special priority to this item for a number of years. Also, in the preamble and article VI of the non-proliferation treaty a specific statutory obligation has been undertaken to pursue urgent negotiations in this regard.

12. It may be added that most speakers at the recently-concluded resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly stressed that underground tests should stop at the earliest possible moment. India was the first country to press for suspension of all nuclear-weapon tests and has consistently been of the view that, whatever might be the differences on the question of verification, all nuclear-weapon tests should be immediately suspended. Negotiations could then be undertaken to resolve the outstanding differences with a view to making the present partial Treaty a comprehensive one.

(Mr. Husain, India)

13. At the same time it should be ensured that the success achieved by the international community in regard to a ban on tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water should be further consolidated by securing the adherence of those States which have not so far signed the Treaty. We are equally clear that there is no justification for any action which might erode the partial test-ban Treaty. Concerning the problem of verification of a comprehensive test ban, India, along with other non-aligned countries, has over the years urged various solutions which have not so far been accepted by the nuclear-weapon States. During our present deliberations a fresh attempt has been made, and specific proposals to resolve the deadlock have been put forward by the delegations of the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.381) and Sweden (ENDC/PV.385). We await the considered views of the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States, and are ready to assist in exploring an acceptable solution.

14. I may add that the Government of India has welcomed the initiative taken by Sweden as a result of which the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm (SIPRI) gathered together scientists and other experts from different countries to discuss the technical aspects of the control of an underground nuclear test ban by seismological methods. A welcome feature of those discussions was the participation for the first time of scientists from the three nuclear-weapon States participating in the work of our Committee, as well as scientists from France. The report of SIPRI (ENDC/230) reveals a substantial measure of agreement at the technical level on the identification by the existing means of detection of nuclear explosions above a certain level, which is much lower than that envisaged in our discussions a few years ago. We hope that these exchanges will be continued, and Indian experts would be glad to assist that process, as they did on this occasion; but further progress on this should not stand in the way of the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

15. And when we speak of a comprehensive test-ban treaty we must inevitably speak of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Whether the benefits from such explosions, in the form of practical applications, are to become available in the near future or in the distant future, when we are legislating for the international community on a long-term basis some provision will have to be made for nuclear

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explosions for peaceful purposes. That question is logically and directly linked to that of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It should be considered in conjunction with a comprehensive test ban and not separately from it. In the first instance, a total prohibition in regard to nuclear explosions must apply to all States, nuclear as well as non-nuclear. An international régime should then be established in respect of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The development of the technology of nuclear excavation projects must be sought, not by way of a modification of the Moscow test-ban Treaty, but in the context of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and through a separately-negotiated agreement which should be part of the international régime for peaceful nuclear explosions.

16. Next, my delegation would like to mention the proposal for the signing of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons (ENDC/227). The use of such weapons was declared by General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) to be contrary to the United Nations Charter and a crime against humanity. At the twenty-first and twenty-second sessions of the General Assembly India supported the draft resolutions urging the convening of a conference for that purpose. In India's view, if the proposed convention is to be effective it will require the active support of all States, and more particularly of States which possess such weapons. In the course of discussions held in this Committee, in the General Assembly and elsewhere, several countries have expressed their views on the proposed convention. Some States have pointed out that in the absence of means of control the proposed convention would undermine their security. It has been the consistent view of the Government of India that all such questions can be considered when the drafting of the proposed convention is taken up.

17. In the course of our recent discussions it has been proposed that we should also discuss two measures in the nature of non-armament: namely the peaceful use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, and the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare. The question of the peaceful use of the sea-bed and ocean floor is a comparatively new but complex subject, and its importance has been highlighted because of recent technological advances in this field. In order to examine its various aspects an ad hoc Committee has been appointed in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2340 (XXII) and has been asked to report to the twenty-third session; but it has been suggested here that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should take up consideration of the military aspects of the problem.

(Mr. Husain, India)

18. India's view has been that the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, outside the limits of present national jurisdictions, should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The technologically-advanced countries should not use that environment for setting up any military bases or fortifications, nor should they test any kind of weapons. That environment, being res communis, should not be subject to appropriation or exclusive use or exploitation by any one State, nor should it be subject to the sovereignty of any nation. The resources of that environment, being the common heritage of mankind, should be used for raising the economic level of peoples throughout the world, particularly in the developing countries. A first step in this direction that could be taken by us here is the adoption of a declaration calling for the reservation of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof exclusively for peaceful purposes.

19. As regards the other measure, concerning chemical and bacteriological warfare -- or, as it has been more appropriately termed by the representative of the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.387, para. 5), microbiological warfare -- the Indian delegation views with interest a discussion on that item. India, as a country traditionally opposed to all weapons of mass destruction, fully supports the idea of the total prohibition of the use of chemical and microbiological weapons. At the twenty-first session of the General Assembly India voted for resolution 2162 (XXI) (ENDC/185), which called for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and urged those States which had not acceded to it to do so. India is, of course, a signatory of the Protocol. However, in view of recent developments and the issues raised here by various delegations, the whole subject needs to be carried a step beyond the position as it is today, but without detriment to the validity and importance of the Protocol. At the same time my delegation cannot agree with the view that the Geneva Protocol, being a declaratory prohibition and without a system of international control -- which in this case it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to provide -- is of no use.

20. Regarding the Working Paper on Microbiological Warfare (ENDC/231) submitted to our Committee by the United Kingdom delegation on 6 August, and the suggestion (ENDC/PV.381, para. 93) that the Secretary-General be asked to prepare a report on the nature and possible effects of chemical weapons and the implications of their use, the Government of India will give those proposals the most careful consideration, and I shall hope to be able to express its views when the subject is discussed substantively.

(Mr. Husain, India)

21. In conclusion, the delegation of India would like to stress that our Committee should, as a matter of the highest priority, concern itself with negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Negotiations on those measures alone, rather than on measures of non-armament, would carry conviction with the peoples of the world, both in regard to the repeatedly-expressed intentions of the great Powers and in regard to the seriousness of the work of this Committee.

22. Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation has listened attentively to the statement which the representative of India has just made and will study with care the various points of interest which he has raised. Of particular interest to us were his views on the necessity for a comprehensive test ban and on the relationship between the regulation of peaceful nuclear explosions and a comprehensive test ban.

23. My remarks today will concern some difficulties in the elaboration of a comprehensive test ban. The representative of the Soviet Union — that is, the Chairman of today's meeting — said on 16 July:

"Another important question which is on the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. Five years have elapsed since the conclusion of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, but it still has not been possible to settle the problem of the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests. The representatives of many countries were fully justified in insisting on the speediest possible agreement on this measure, demanding the complete prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests including underground nuclear explosions. The Soviet Union urges all States, and, above all, the nuclear States, immediately to solve this important problem." (ENDC/PV.381, para. 32)

24. I think it is agreed that the Committee must respond to General Assembly resolution 2343 (XXII) of 19 December 1967, which inter alia requests us —

"... to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests and to report to the General Assembly on this matter at its twenty-third session." (ENDC/210)

A large number of countries regard the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban as the logical next step on the road to general and complete disarmament; but real

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progress towards a comprehensive test ban will not be easily achieved. It seems to me that our Committee bears a responsibility, based on its experience as a continuing body for arms control, to acknowledge and make clear how complex the problems are. If we wish to achieve measures which will be effective -- that is, measures which will really reduce tensions and increase international security -- we cannot expect quick, simple or easy solutions.

25. In my statement on 18 July I referred as follows to the relationship between the comprehensive test ban and progress on the limitation of strategic nuclear weapon vehicles:

"An agreement to halt the development of offensive and defensive missile systems should also make it much easier to reach an agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear testing, thus completing the Moscow Treaty of 1963 (ENDC/100/Rev.1). However, we in this Committee should not wait until there actually is agreement on what is likely to be a very difficult subject of negotiation --- that is, the halting of the race in the production of missiles, offensive and defensive." (ENDC/PV.382, para.10)

The Committee can make a valuable contribution to the eventual solution we are seeking by a detailed discussion and study of the various aspects of an eventual treaty. Verification, in the Canadian view, is the crucial aspect. The need for on-site inspection is still a matter of controversy. However, we seem to accept generally that detecting and identifying violations of a treaty can be made to depend to a great extent on seismological techniques. I should like to pass on to the Committee Canadian scientific opinion on recent international progress in this field, and to outline the state of development in Canada of the techniques of seismological detection and identification of underground explosions.

26. In the opinion of Canadian scientists, an opinion which seems to be shared by Swedish scientists, there has indeed in the recent past been encouraging progress in the detection and identification of seismic events. Perhaps the most important development, as Mrs. Myrdal told us on 30 July (ENDC/PV.385, para.8) is the acceptance of a positive method for identifying explosions down to yields of 20 to 60 kilotons in hard rock -- a method which, for convenience in this statement, we shall call the "positive identifier" method. However, as Mrs. Myrdal noted, this system becomes less reliable in less dense earth structures (*ibid.*, para.12). Then there is the possibility

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of evading detection when or if explosions take place in large cavities -- the so-called de-coupling process.

27. Another problem still exists, and that is that a seismological network, in order to apply this identification criterion to events of lower magnitude, must be sufficiently sensitive to provide detection. To provide this high detection capability, we are assured by our scientists, is by no means a simple problem. More research on this identification system will certainly be necessary in order to deal with explosions of lower yields than the 20- to 60-kiloton explosions which have been mentioned.

28. As for the Canadian contribution to seismological research relevant to test-ban control, Canada has no programme of secret research. Data, records and conclusions of Canadian scientists working in the field are transmitted or are available to all members of the international seismological community. There is now working a network of twenty-three uniformly-instrumented seismograph stations within Canada, and two more should be added this year. At Yellowknife in the North-West Territories we have a medium-aperture short-period array which we work in co-operation with the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. We have a modest digital-processing facility in Ottawa for research into array signals.

29. Using the twenty-three standard-station network, Canadian seismologists have made a pilot study of nuclear explosions from the United States Nevada test site and of earthquakes in the western United States. That study showed to their satisfaction that positive identification of the explosions was possible using the surface wave method -- that is, the "positive identifier" method previously referred to -- down to yields of 10 to 20 kilotons in hard rock. Unfortunately, Canadian detection capability falls off in the lower end of this range; therefore it was not possible to quote a probability for detection of explosions of lower yield. It appears, however, that the probability of detection of Nevada explosions may be calculated as being reasonably high above 20 to 60 kilotons in hard rock and as falling rapidly below that level. Using only our own resources, we find that the situation rapidly worsens for explosions outside North America. This problem would be alleviated to a great extent if our scientists could have access to data from other seismological networks. This is the "seismic detection club" concept, which Canada has supported from its beginning. I shall return to this point later in my statement.

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30. Other Canadian research activities in this field have related to signal processing to determine depths of focus of underground explosions. Results of this research will be published shortly. It has been found that this method is very effective in screening out earthquakes of greater depth than about 50 kilometres. Locations of events have been automatically determined with accuracies of a few hundred kilometres from one well-sited medium-aperture array, and the results of this research have been published. Lastly, research has been carried out using arrays to separate out simultaneously-arriving signals from two different sources, and the results have been published.

31. There has been research activity also in Canada on other so-called diagnostic aids which can be used for identification of nuclear explosions if the explosion is too small for the "positive identifier" previously referred to. The United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Japan are also studying these "aids"; but so far there is no general agreement on the conclusions which the several countries draw from their research. The advice of our scientists is that, as of now, these methods do not give as good results as the "positive identifier" method, although there seems to be promise of progress.

32. The upshot of all this is that the Canadian position on control of underground test prohibition is virtually as I outlined it last autumn. I shall not take the Committee's time this morning by repeating what I said then, but would simply refer representatives to document ENDC/PV.332 of 21 September 1967, and especially to paragraphs 14-23.

33. This should not be taken to mean that there is no room for movement or that we do not anticipate progress. That is not so. Research in this area is continuing in Canada as elsewhere, and I think we can look forward hopefully to better results. The prospects for such results would in our view be greatly enhanced by an increase in international co-operation and exchange of data. This is in keeping with our long-standing interest and participation in the "seismic detection club". In our view, the establishment of a world-wide interlocking network of seismological stations and an international data-exchange centre would pay enormous dividends in terms of both pure science and test-ban control. Indeed, the very interesting summary of the report of the SIPRI Seismic Study Group which the Swedish representative has put before us as a conference document (ENDC/230) points out that progress in scientific seismic research would be advanced by merging existing seismological networks into one world-wide data-exchange system.

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34. In making this statement we have tried to present a realistic assessment of the possibilities of detection and identification of underground nuclear-weapon tests as our scientific advisers see them. It seemed necessary to point out some of the obstacles which still remain to be overcome. We are not pessimistic: there are areas of research where progress is constantly being made, and there is hope for even more progress. Our task in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is to find out how the results which the scientists give us may be applied to the problem of providing verification which will be satisfactory to all parties. The Canadian delegation is confident that this can be done, given good will and tenacity.

35. We hope to comment at a later meeting on some of the points raised by Mr. Mulley at our meeting on 16 July (ENDC/PV.381), and by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, at our meeting on 30 July (ENDC/PV.385).

36. Mr. CASTANEDA (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I wish to express the satisfaction with which my delegation has welcomed the work of this session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The discussion of new disarmament subjects will be inspired by the same spirit which moved this Committee to bring to a successful conclusion the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/226*).

37. With reference to the announcement that I made in this Committee on 25 July (ENDC/PV.384, para.18) of the signing by Mexico of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, my Government has instructed me to communicate to this Committee the text of the identical notes which the Mexican Ministry for Foreign Affairs has addressed to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union concerning the signature of that treaty. The text is as follows:

"In signing the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons annexed to resolution 2373 (XXII) adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 12 June 1968, I have the honour to state that the Government of Mexico understands:

"1. That, in virtue of what is stipulated in article VII of the treaty, none of its provisions are to be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of Mexico as a State party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco)^{1/}, which was opened for signature on 14 February 1967 and concerning which the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967;

(Mr. Castañeda, (Mexico))

"2. That at present any nuclear explosive can be used as a nuclear weapon and there is no indication that in the immediate future nuclear explosives could be produced that would not be potentially nuclear weapons. However, if technical progress succeeds in altering this situation it will be necessary to amend the relevant provisions of the Treaty in accordance with the procedure laid down therein.

"My Government hopes that Your Excellency's Government, as a depositary Government of the Treaty, when informing States able to become parties to the Treaty of the signature of the Treaty by the Government of Mexico, will also kindly communicate to them the text of the present statement.

"I take this opportunity, etc."

38. On the same subject I should like to add, on the instructions of my Government, that my delegation noted with great appreciation the praise expressed by the President of the United States for the Treaty of Tlatelolco (which he called "a worthy example" and a "great achievement of Latin American diplomacy") in his message to the Committee (ENDC/228) which was read out by Mr. Foster on Tuesday 16 July (ENDC/PV.381, para.53).

39. At the same meeting we were also gratified to hear the other co-Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Roshchin, declare, in explaining the contents of the Soviet memorandum reproduced in document ENDC/227: "it is necessary to emphasize the importance of the creation of nuclear-free zones ..." (ENDC/PV.381, para.40). He went on to say:

"Possibilities are inherent in the creation of nuclear-free zones for protecting the security of States and of whole areas of the world from the threat of a nuclear war. The Soviet Union, as we have repeatedly declared, supports the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world ..." (ibid.)

40. We are particularly pleased with this authoritative definition of the position of the Soviet Government, because it is in keeping with the attitude which certainly inspired the General Assembly of the United Nations to adopt in connexion with the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which created the only denuclearized zone at present existing in lands inhabited by man, resolution 2286 (XXII), in which inter alia it "Invites Powers possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty as soon as possible." (ENDC/210)

(Mr. Castañeda, Mexico)

41. The signing of the non-proliferation treaty signified the triumph of wisdom and common sense. But it was not an easy triumph. The scepticism of many people, the hostility of some, and considerable resistance based on doubts and scruples which were sometimes justified had to be overcome. To overcome that resistance the nuclear Powers had to make promises and assume firm commitments in respect to the non-nuclear Powers. The latter, for their part, made their signature of the treaty depend on one condition. That condition was, of course, that the nuclear Powers should within a reasonable time fulfil the two basic commitments assumed by them: first the one mentioned in article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general disarmament; and secondly, to contribute effectively to the peaceful nuclear development of non-nuclear countries, particularly by making available to them the benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

42. The time has come to fulfil these commitments. For the moment I leave aside the second one. The other, the commitment urgently to pursue negotiations on effective measures for nuclear disarmament, means that non-nuclear countries cannot accept that the situation reflected by the treaty, namely the existence of two categories of States, nuclear and non-nuclear, should be perpetuated and become institutional. If we do not want the entire structure of the treaty on non-proliferation to fall down, it is necessary, as has been said so many times since it was negotiated, for the world to be convinced that nuclear disarmament is not a mere utopia but a goal which can be achieved in our time. This means the conclusion of agreements on all, or at least some, of the measures listed in our draft article IV-C, submitted last year (ENDC/196), which was the basis of the present article VI of the treaty: prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests; cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons; liquidation of all existing stockpiles of such weapons; elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery; and an agreement on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

43. We must realize that the treaty on non-proliferation is living on borrowed time and is precarious. If rapid progress is not made in carrying out its two implicit conditions, not only will the treaty live under the threat of the review conference which will examine the progress achieved in regard to disarmament in the five years

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since the treaty's entry into force, but the very process of ratification of the treaty may be affected by the results which our Committee achieves, here and now, in the manner of setting about disarmament negotiations for the coming years.

44. Our task in the present session is to work out an agenda for the disarmament negotiations which will on the one hand respond to the desires of the international community and on the other hand be viable and realistic. However, an agenda for disarmament is not only an agenda for a conference. Our task actually goes much further: we have to draw up a programme of work for several years. And, as has been rightly said in the Committee, an agenda on disarmament cannot be merely a technical document. In so far as an agenda sets priorities for the examination of various disarmament measures, its drafting is a political function of the greatest importance. The fixing of priorities for the study of some subjects rather than of others will inevitably be influenced by the compensatory character of some disarmament measures as compared with others and by the imperative necessity of keeping the balance between the nuclear Powers during the whole process of disarmament and in each of its various stages. That is why the fixing of priorities has such great importance. One might also say that agreement on a relatively precise agenda would in itself constitute appreciable progress in disarmament negotiations.

45. The Government of Mexico has studied with attention the problem of the agenda and of priorities. We have carefully considered the subjects specifically entrusted by General Assembly resolutions to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for its consideration, as well as the nine-point memorandum of the Soviet Government (ENDC/227), the proposals of the United States of America (ENDC/228) and the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.381, paras.84 et seq.), the list of priorities formulated by Sweden (ENDC/PV.383, para.6 et seq.), and the views of other members of the Committee. The joint study of those elements suggests to us two preliminary reflexions and a conclusion on the manner in which, in our opinion, the agenda should be drawn up, and which moreover does not claim to be in any way original.

46. The first reflexion is that it would be an error if we considered that the grant of priority to one subject because of its importance and urgency excluded the study of other subjects. The present situation is entirely different from that which has prevailed during the last few years. Then the dominant subject, which had absolute priority and on which all our efforts were focused, was the non-proliferation treaty.

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While that treaty was being negotiated, the consideration of all other disarmament questions was practically suspended. Such a situation would be simply unacceptable for the future. As was rightly said by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Mulley (ENDC/PV.381, para.62), we cannot proceed at a leisurely tempo with one topic under consideration and allow another five years to pass before reaching agreement on a further major measure, forgetting about all the rest. There are now many topics simultaneously calling for our attention. We should therefore adapt our working methods to the need to consider various subjects at the same time. The present situation calls for parallel advances on several fronts. Granting the highest priority to a single subject means that we consider it more important than the others, but not that we are neglecting the study of the rest.

47. The second reflexion relates to three, or possibly four, subjects which are in a similar position. The General Assembly has requested our Committee to study the question of the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. Among other subjects which could be studied by the Committee, the importance of reaching agreement on the prohibition of chemical and microbiological weapons has been emphasized by the United Kingdom (ENDC/PV.387) and other countries.

48. Thirdly, the developing countries are particularly interested in institutionalizing the assistance which the nuclear Powers can give them in science and technology, including the potential benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

49. Those three questions are undoubtedly of the greatest importance. At the same time there are others that could most probably be the subject of specific agreements. But that does not mean that they should necessarily have priority, in the sense that we should concentrate all our first efforts on them. What the international community hopes for, what it waits for, what it has been promised, are agreements to stop the nuclear arms race, tangible measures of nuclear disarmament: that is, concretely, agreements on the limitation and the eventual reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, on the cessation of their manufacture, and on the prohibition of all tests of nuclear weapons.

50. The agreements that might be reached, as we fervently hope, on the other three subjects I have mentioned must be considered as complementary to those of a primary

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character. Obviously an effort must be made to start negotiations on those three subjects simultaneously with negotiations on direct nuclear disarmament. But the international community would not accept an agreement on the demilitarization of the sea-bed, for instance, or on the prohibition of biological weapons as a substitute for the hoped-for agreements on measures of authentic nuclear disarmament. I am happy to agree in this respect with the views just expressed by the representative of India.

51. I shall now say a few words on the priority of questions and on the agenda. First, there is no doubt that the question which now has the highest priority is that of the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation and eventual reduction of systems of offensive and defensive strategic ballistic missiles. By their very nature such negotiations must be private and bilateral. Our role can only consist in encouraging the two participants in the negotiations. But, as has been indicated by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, the Eighteen-Nation Committee should be as fully informed as possible on the progress of such negotiations, if only because of the close connexion between that question and other questions which have to be dealt with by our Committee.

52. Concerning the subject or subjects which call for the highest priority and which could be considered by our Committee, we think first of all of the total prohibition of nuclear tests, that is tests in the only environment where they are not yet prohibited -- the underground environment. That priority is justified because the prohibition would be an effective measure of nuclear disarmament inasmuch as it would hinder the development of new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons, because the General Assembly has given it special preference in numerous resolutions, and because it has already been considered by the Committee for some years. Moreover, an agreement between the Powers directly concerned, although difficult, as has been emphasized by several speakers -- including Mr. Burns in his statement today -- is perhaps not so improbable, although we recognize that in regard to disarmament no agreement is easy.

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53. Because of the structural relationship between some measures of nuclear disarmament, it is obvious that the other question with the highest priority is cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, which appears in item 2 of the Soviet memorandum. As that document states, the agreement could deal either with all the complex measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons or with some of them. One aspect of this subject would be cessation of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons.

54. It would certainly be pertinent in this connexion to mention the Latin-American proposal presented during the second part of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly: namely to add to article VI of the draft treaty, after the words "nuclear arms race", the words "including cessation of the manufacture and improvement of such weapons". Although in this case, as in the case of other disarmament measures, the principal protagonists will be the United States and the Soviet Union, this subject must be examined by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Its members will undoubtedly be able to contribute to the negotiations notwithstanding the technical complexity. I believe that the two co-Chairmen should indicate to the Committee how they consider that this subject should be analysed, which of its components are divisible and allow of separate examination and which constitute an indivisible unit. Similarly, they should indicate how in their opinion this subject is linked with others, and consequently should indicate whether it should be negotiated jointly and simultaneously with others or not, so that the Committee may have a clearer idea of its agenda.

55. Those are the subjects which, not only because of their importance but also because of their urgency, have the very highest priority. They are subjects the fate of which can have a decisive influence on the life of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

56. Next come the three other subjects mentioned, all of them of the highest importance although perhaps not of the same urgency. But moreover, and above all, they are not measures which depend one upon another; neither does agreement on any of

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the three require previous agreement in other fields. I refer to the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, to the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and to the measures for converting into tangible reality the nuclear co-operation for peaceful purposes which the nuclear Powers have undertaken to grant to the non-nuclear countries. I see no reason for postponing the study of these three questions, nor do I see why they cannot be examined simultaneously.

57. The relative autonomy of each of these three questions allows them to be dealt with without waiting until a treaty has been concluded, for example, for ceasing the production of fissionable materials. The possibility of our Committee examining them simultaneously during the same session does not present insuperable difficulties. Here I touch on the Committee's methods of work and the organization of its future work, which we dealt with at a closed meeting a few days ago. I should not wish to speak on this matter in detail because, amongst other reasons, I believe that we must be very flexible in it. But it should certainly not be impossible or even difficult to arrange, for example, that at the same time as the Committee discussed the subjects of the very highest priority, a sub-committee composed of a smaller number of States should devote itself to the specific task of drafting a treaty for the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, after receiving general directives from the Committee, and in due course another appropriate sub-committee should try to draft a treaty for the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. Thus our Committee could make progress in the study of this last subject, while at the same time giving urgent consideration to the appropriateness of asking the Secretary-General to prepare a preliminary study of the implications of the use of such weapons.

58. As for the other subject within this category, namely scientific and technical co-operation, and in particular the proposal to make available the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions to the non-nuclear Powers, it seems to us also that, once we know the conclusions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, which has this item on its agenda and is to be held within a month, it will be possible to give thought at once to the examination of this subject in the manner which appears to be most appropriate in the light of the conclusions of the Conference.

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59. Lastly, I should like to deal separately with another subject of great interest to my country: the creation of regional denuclearized zones. Undoubtedly the main impetus for the creation of such zones must come from the countries of the region themselves, as has happened in Latin America. The Committee on Disarmament cannot replace this resolve, but it can sponsor, recommend and stimulate the creation of such denuclearized zones.

60. Perhaps regional disarmament is acquiring a new dimension. The countries of a region, besides agreeing to remain denuclearized in the future, could achieve the more immediate aim of limiting and even reducing from now on their conventional armaments and military forces. This aspiration is not new. But no progress has yet been made owing to various obstacles, one of which, and not the smallest, is the facility with which medium-sized and small countries can acquire armaments from the great Powers. The rivalry between these Powers and the phenomenon which has been called the "cold war" explain to a considerable extent the absurd armaments race which has been going on for some time within more than one region.

61. It seems, fortunately, that quite recently there has been a new awareness of this problem. We are pleased to note that both the message of President Johnson to this Committee at the beginning of this session on 16 July, and the nine-point memorandum of the Soviet Government, indicate the readiness of those Governments to reach agreement on this subject. Obviously, where both conventional disarmament and denuclearization are concerned, the main impetus must come from the States of the region themselves and the corresponding agreements must be worked out regionally. President Johnson said that such arrangements would be respected by the United States, and added that his country was ready "to support any reasonable measure affecting the activities of the major weapons-producers that would make a regional agreement more effective ..." (ENDC/228, p.3). If the great Powers, which are the main suppliers of weapons, would agree together to abstain from supplying weapons to their client States -- and I use these words in the Roman sense -- the developing countries might be able to eliminate one of the greatest obstacles to their development.

62. The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): With the Committee's permission, I shall now speak in my capacity as representative of the Soviet Union.

63. The Soviet delegation, in its statement (ENDC/PV.386) at the meeting of the Committee on 1 August, explained the position of the Soviet Union on the basic problems relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Today we intend to dwell upon other proposals contained in the Soviet Government memorandum (ENDC/227) of 1 July.

64. The Soviet delegation is gratified to note that many of the representatives who have spoken here have given considerable attention to the question of prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, which occupies an important place among the proposals put forward in the Soviet memorandum. Bearing in mind the threat which the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons represents for mankind, the Soviet Government proposes that the Eighteen-Nation Committee consider ways and means of securing the observance by all States of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

65. In this connexion we should like to draw attention to United Nations General Assembly resolution 2162 B (XXI) (ENDC/185), which calls for strict observation by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare, which was signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and condemns all actions contrary to those objectives. The resolution invites all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol. A number of States which were not already parties to the Geneva Protocol responded positively to the General Assembly's appeal and acceded to that agreement. These included such countries as Tunisia, Sierra Leone, Madagascar, Ghana and Niger.

66. At the same time, there are States which have not responded to the appeal of the General Assembly and which still have not acceded to the Geneva Protocol. These are, in the first place, the United States of America, as well as Japan, Brazil and some other countries. What is more -- and this is stressed in the Soviet Government memorandum -- the United States is using chemical weapons in its war of aggression in Viet-Nam, thus violating universally-recognized standards of international law.

67. The Geneva Protocol was drafted immediately after the First World War, during which the use of gases and toxic substances cost many thousands of lives. This agreement was a further development of that important branch of international law which deals with the prohibition of particularly barbarous methods of warfare. Mankind began long ago

to search for ways of differentiating between various methods of warfare. Article 22 of the annex to the Fourth Hague Convention, 1907, concerning the laws and customs of war on land states clearly: "The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited."

68. The Geneva Protocol set a legal barrier to the use of such means of mass destruction, and this was of great importance in the Second World War. The warning given by the Powers of the anti-Hitler coalition that the use of gases and bacteriological means of warfare was inadmissible and that a violator would not go unpunished had its effect on fascist Germany. In giving that warning the Powers of the anti-Hitler coalition based themselves on that important international agreement, the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

69. Many members of our Committee have emphasized with complete justification that the Geneva Protocol must be observed and that all States should accede to it. This was pointed out in particular by the representatives of Poland (ENDC/PV.385, para.70), Romania (ENDC/PV.386, para.16) and Sweden, and in today's statements by the representatives of India and Mexico. Thus the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, declared on 23 July:

"... we recognize fully the need to respect the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

That international instrument is part and parcel of established international law." (ENDC/PV.383, para. 10)

70. But the representatives of certain countries in our Committee --- those of Italy and the United Kingdom in particular --- evidently disagree with this widespread view, which is also reflected in the aforementioned resolution of the United Nations General Assembly. The United Kingdom representative, Mr. Mulley, did not consider the Geneva Protocol "entirely satisfactory" (ENDC/PV.387, para.6). The representative of Italy, Mr. Caracciolo, directly urged the revision of that agreement. I am thinking of a passage in his statement which is contained in document ENDC/PV.385, para. 53.

71. The representative of the United Kingdom has submitted for the consideration of the Committee a working paper on microbiological warfare (ENDC/231), and has also put forward (ENDC/PV.387) some arguments on the question of chemical weapons that cast doubt upon the significance of the Geneva Protocol, which established an important standard of international law.

72. What do the proposals of the United Kingdom delegation amount to? In its opinion, the question of chemical weapons must be separated from that of bacteriological means of warfare. Then, it is proposed that we should recognize that the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons is today practically an insoluble problem and that we should concentrate on working out a convention on "microbiological" weapons. Does that not mean that in the opinion of the United Kingdom delegation we should engage once again in solving problems which have long since been solved and have become an established standard of international law?

(The Chairman, USSR)

73. Of course, no one will deny that, since the Geneva Protocol was signed, new types of chemical and bacteriological weapons have emerged. But that does not at all mean -- as would follow from the arguments of the United Kingdom delegation -- that the Geneva Protocol has become obsolete. Its draftsmen were aware of the possibility of such a development, and therefore they stipulated specifically that the ban contained in the Protocol covered the use of asphyxiating, poisonous and other similar gases and all analogous liquids, materials and devices, as well as bacteriological means of warfare. And the new gases and bacteriological means developed in recent years are still gases and bacteriological means; they are not new kinds of weapons which are not covered by the Geneva Protocol. That agreement, the Geneva Protocol, covers a very important and wide range of means which can be used as weapons of mass destruction -- all imaginable types of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

74. The proposal to revise the Geneva Protocol is a dangerous one. If we were to follow that course we might destroy an already existing, useful and important international document on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons without having replaced it by a better or indeed by any other international instrument -- a treaty or convention that would provide for the prohibition of the use of such types of weapons.

75. Therefore, the question is not that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 should be revised, but that it should be strictly observed. That is the task set by the General Assembly, and the Soviet memorandum proposes that ways and means to carry it out should be found. Having achieved this we could pass on to the next measure -- cessation of the manufacture of chemical and bacteriological weapons and their destruction. The Soviet Union is a determined advocate of the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and bacteriological weapons.

76. Another important measure to which the Soviet delegation would like to draw the attention of the Committee is the question raised in the Soviet memorandum of the peaceful use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. This question is now assuming ever-increasing importance. The exploitation by man of the sea-bed and the ocean floor involves not only the use of this new source of wealth for the economic needs of peoples and States. If no appropriate and timely measures are taken the sea-bed and ocean floor space, which occupies five-sevenths of the surface of the earth, may become a new sphere of military rivalry between States with all the ensuing consequences, namely the

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extension of the arms race to this field. Should this happen, the sea-bed and the ocean floor, which are a promising source of mineral and other riches for mankind, will turn into a new source of military threat.

77. At a time when the military use of this new environment has not yet been developed to any great extent, when in point of fact the question is rather that of taking preventive measures, it is comparatively less difficult to ban the military use of this environment. An important practical step in this direction would be the achievement of an agreement not to use the sea-bed and the ocean floor for military purposes. This should be done without delay, while military activities on the sea-bed and the ocean floor have not yet gained in scope. If we fail to take now effective measures to exclude the sea-bed and the ocean floor from the sphere of the military activities of States, it will be much more difficult to do so later.

78. Basing itself on that premise, the Soviet Union proposes in its memorandum on disarmament the examination of the question of -

"... giving timely expression in appropriate form, to a regime such as would ensure the utilization of the sea-bed beyond the limits of the present territorial waters solely for peaceful purposes." (ENDC/227, p.5)

We noted with satisfaction that this proposal has met with wide support by many States. Great attention has been devoted to this question by the representatives of the socialist countries and by the representative of Sweden in their statements in the Committee, and attention has also been given to it in today's statements by the representatives of India and Mexico, as well as by a number of other States. Stressing the importance and the imperative need of reaching an agreement on the question of the use of the sea-bed, the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, declared:

"As to the importance and urgency of an internationally accepted obligation to refrain from using for military purposes the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of the territorial waters of coastal States, there can be no disagreement, I am sure." (ENDC/PV.383, para.12)

79. While recognizing the importance of problems relating to the establishment of a regime for the sea-bed and the ocean floor, the United States displays no readiness to agree to a ban on all military activities there and proposes limiting the matter merely to a pledge not to place weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. What grounds can there be for this? Is it in the interests of disarmament to leave open the possibility of using the sea-bed and the ocean floor for the unleashing of a conventional arms race there?

(The Chairman, USSR)

80. It is quite obvious that any military activities by States on the sea-bed and the ocean floor would increase the military threat, interfere with the exploitation of the riches of the world's oceans and their floors for peaceful purposes, and be detrimental to freedom of navigation. We must seek to preclude any military use by States of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. Only such a solution can in fact fully meet the interests of international security and preserve that important sphere for peaceful utilization by man.

81. The Soviet delegation would like to draw attention to another aspect of this problem which is in our view of great importance. We deem it necessary to extend the ban on military activities by States over the whole of the sea-bed and the ocean floor with the sole exception of territorial waters. In proposing such an approach we are guided by the interests of solving this problem in the most effective way in order to ensure the peaceful utilization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for the benefit of mankind. The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that its proposal on the prohibition of the military use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the territorial waters of the coastal States will meet with the understanding and support of members of the Committee.

82. May I now express the position of the Soviet Union on measures for regional disarmament? Here we have in mind first of all the problem of establishing denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. The Soviet Union bases itself on the premise that the establishment of such zones would effectively limit the area for the stationing of nuclear weapons and would fully correspond with the aim of preventing the direct or indirect proliferation of such weapons.

83. The question of denuclearized zones has been considered repeatedly at sessions of the General Assembly and in our Committee. At the present session of the Committee the representatives of the socialist countries have once again expressed themselves in favour of establishing denuclearized zones in various parts of the world, having noted the importance of the establishment of such a zone in Central Europe, an area where a great number of nuclear weapons is concentrated. The withdrawal of nuclear weapons from various zones would be an important means of preventing the threat of nuclear war and ensuring international security.

84. We also sympathize with the desire of the peoples of Latin America, Africa and other areas for the establishment of denuclearized zones within their territories. In this connexion we note the highly interesting statement made today by the representative of Mexico, who dealt in a very thorough and convincing manner with certain important

aspects relating to the establishment of denuclearized zones, particularly in the Latin-American area. The Soviet Union believes that the obligation to establish denuclearized zones could be assumed not only by large groups of States covering whole continents or large geographical areas but also by more restricted groups of States and even by individual countries.

85. The Soviet Union also supports proposals for regional disarmament and the reduction of armaments in various regions of the world, including the Near East. However, as we have pointed out, the question of measures aimed at restricting the arms race in the Near East could only be considered, of course, subject to elimination of the consequences of the Israeli aggression against Arab countries and, above all, the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories of the countries occupied by them.

86. The elimination of foreign military bases in the territories of other States would be an important measure to curb the arms race and bring us closer to disarmament. The General Assembly adopted at its twenty-first session a resolution on the elimination of foreign military bases which stressed that -

"... this question is of paramount importance and therefore necessitates serious discussion because of its implications for international peace and security." (General Assembly resolution 2165 (XXI)) (ENDC/185)

The General Assembly requested the Eighteen-Nation Committee to submit a report on the results of the consideration of this important issue.

87. The foreign military bases of the Western Powers and their military alliances create a threat to peace by considerably increasing the danger of armed conflicts. They serve as an instrument of a policy of aggression and interference in the domestic affairs of other States, and a means of suppressing national liberation movements. The true nature and the purpose of foreign military bases are revealed with particular clearness in connexion with the United States aggression against Viet-Nam. We hope that consideration of the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the territories of other States, which is what the General Assembly calls for, will enable us to find ways of solving it in the interest of ensuring international security and progress towards disarmament.

88. The cessation of flights of bombers carrying nuclear weapons beyond national boundaries is one of the important issues among the urgent measures for disarmament which, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, should be implemented in the nearest future. Such flights constitute a permanent source of risk of an outbreak of nuclear

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war as a result of a technical failure, an accident or other unforeseen event. That has become particularly obvious after a number of accidents to United States military aircraft with nuclear weapons on board which have occurred recently. We do not, of course, share the view of the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Mulley, who in his statement at our meeting of 16 July questioned (ENDC/PV.381, para.72) the appropriateness of discussing that matter in the Committee. We believe that the Committee should take up that important problem, which arouses understandable concern and alarm among many nations.

89. In putting forward a broad programme of concrete measures covering both nuclear weapons and conventional arms, the Soviet Union bases itself on the premise that the implementation of such measures would promote the eventual accomplishment of the main task -- general and complete disarmament under effective international control. To reach agreement on that problem is still one of the main objectives of the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Resolution 2342 adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-second session -- and this was referred to this morning by the representative of India -- contains an urgent request that the Committee "resume at the earliest possible date consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament ..." (ENDC/210)

90. We should also like to point out that the non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/226*) contains in its article VI a provision which binds the parties to the treaty to pursue negotiations in good faith on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is to do everything necessary to ensure progress in solving this most important question of our time. We realize that the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament involves great difficulties and calls for strenuous efforts. Nevertheless, to ensure international security requires that the efforts aimed at reaching agreement on this problem shall continue and be redoubled so as to remove for ever the threat of war and to direct the enormous resources wasted on the arms race towards the benefit of the peoples.

91. The race in military preparations continues to accelerate. Whereas in 1962, when the Eighteen-Nation Committee began negotiations on disarmament, the world military expenditure amounted to \$120,000 million a year, in 1965 -- three years after the Committee began its work -- this military expenditure was estimated to be \$180,000 million -- in other words, a fifty per cent increase. At present it is already over \$200,000 million, and is estimated at about \$225,000 million a year.

92. The Soviet Union is determined to do everything possible to accelerate the solution of the problems of general and complete disarmament and to achieve genuine international security. Mr. Gromyko, the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, said on 27 June:

"The Soviet Government is prepared, as before, to implement the programme of general and complete disarmament and calls upon all States of the world to spare no efforts in accomplishing this historic task."

The Soviet memorandum on disarmament draws the attention of all States to the need to achieve concrete results in the solution of this problem.

93. The Eighteen-Nation Committee has before it a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control submitted by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Add.1). The Soviet programme of general and complete disarmament indicates a concrete way by keeping to which it would be possible to solve this problem.

94. The socialist States members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee have repeatedly displayed their good will and determination to secure the achievement of general and complete disarmament. During the current session the representatives of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania have emphasized the importance of the solution of this problem, as have the representatives of India and Mexico in their statements this morning. Now that the common efforts of many States have resulted in the non-proliferation treaty, the world has secured another substantial bridgehead for progress towards accomplishing the goals of disarmament, including those of general and complete disarmament.

95. In conclusion, I should like to say that the Soviet delegation has listened with great interest to the very important statements of the representatives of India, Canada and Mexico. Those statements will be analyzed very carefully and with due interest by the Soviet delegation, which will take them into account at the present and subsequent sessions of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

96. Mr. BUNN (United States of America): We welcome the succinct statement which our colleague, Mr. Hussain of India, has made this morning of his country's views. We shall study with particular care his observations on the cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes and on the relationship of the comprehensive text ban to peaceful nuclear explosions.

97. We found Mr. Burns' contribution on the results of Canadian seismological research of considerable interest and benefit to the Committee.

(Mr. Bunn, United States)

93. I listened with great interest to the helpful comments of Mr. Castañeda on the subject of the Committee's programme of work. As one of the co-Chairmen, the United States will take his views into account in attempting to agree upon an agenda for the Committee.

99. As my delegation has made clear in previous statements, we believe that the priority task for this Committee is to deal effectively with the nuclear problem. This is the most pressing responsibility which the non-proliferation treaty lays on its parties. It is the most important of the items for which the General Assembly looks to us for accomplishment. It should take first place on the agenda of all countries represented here.

100. But we cannot neglect the pressing problem of chemical and bacteriological warfare. We noted the new interest in this problem evidenced in the statements made this morning by yourself, Mr. Chairman, and by the representatives of India and Mexico, and in the earlier statements by the representatives of Poland (ENDC/PV.385, para.70) and Sweden (ENDC/PV.383, paras.9, 10). Let me also call the attention of representatives here to the noteworthy statement on this subject which was made by the Secretary-General, U Thant, on 10 July. He said:

"In my view, the development of the biological and chemical warfare materials is in a way far more serious than the development of nuclear weapons. When I say 'in a way' I have in mind the fact that the nuclear weapons are a rich man's property or a rich country's property -- only the very rich and the super-rich can develop, manufacture and maintain them. As far as biological and chemical warfare materials are concerned, it is in many ways not only the exclusive property of the rich, but they are easily accessible to the poor countries also. That is why it is far more dangerous." (Information Service Note No.43, p.10)

101. Whether used by rich or by poor, these are weapons of mass destruction which constitute a danger to all mankind. And as we begin to deal effectively with the nuclear problem they could become of increasingly greater importance in the arsenals of States which already possess them. Moreover, if they spread into the hands of an ever larger number of States the dangers of their use in time of war will multiply.

102. Aware of the consequences of neglecting this question, several delegations have made proposals to deal with it. These proposals divide conveniently into three categories: first, banning the use in war of chemical and bacteriological weapons; second, banning the production and possession of such weapons; and third, calling for United Nations studies of their effects and the implications of their use. I shall discuss each of these categories.

(Mr. Bunn, United States)

103. The first category covers proposals for banning the use of such weapons in war. You have proposed today, Mr. Chairman, that this Committee examine ways and means of securing the observance by all States of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of poisonous gases and bacteriological methods of warfare. As we all know, international revulsion against the use of such weapons during the First World War led to this Protocol. Since the First World War nations have continued to condemn the use of these weapons.

104. While the United States is not a party to the Protocol, we continue to support the worthy objectives which it seeks to achieve. We have never used biological weapons of any kind, bacteriological or otherwise. We were not the first to engage in gas warfare in the First World War and we have not engaged in it since that time.

105. We played a crucial role in preventing the horrors of gas warfare during the Second World War. In 1943 President Roosevelt gave a serious warning of severe retaliation if others resorted to gas warfare. He stated that the use of poisonous gas "has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind." He added categorically that "We shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies." I noted your recognition this morning, Mr. Chairman, of the effectiveness of this warning in the Second World War. In 1960 President Eisenhower reaffirmed United States policy of not using such weapons first; and Secretary Rusk has stated recently that it is against our policy to engage in gas warfare. We are not now doing so and have not done so since the First World War.

106. On 5 December 1966 we voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2162 B (XXI) (ENDC/185) which called for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In explaining our vote the United States representative stated:

"... whether, or by what procedure, States that have not yet done so should adhere to the Geneva Protocol is for each of them to decide in the light of constitutional and other considerations that may determine their adherence to any international instrument, and particularly one which dates from 1925. What is essential today is to obtain from States a formal public expression of intent to observe strictly the objectives and principles of the Geneva Protocol." (A/PV.1484, provisional, p.19-20)

Resolution 2162 B contained such a formal expression of intent. It was adopted by an overwhelming vote.

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107. Mr. Mulley, our distinguished United Kingdom colleague, has suggested (ENDC/PV.381, paras.87 et seq.) that the 1925 Protocol be supplemented by a new convention which would, among other things, prescribe the use for hostile purposes of microbiological agents and declare unlawful microbiological methods of warfare of any kind.

108. It should be noted, of course, that the Geneva Protocol already prohibits "the use ... of bacteriological methods of warfare". As we understand it, Mr. Mulley's proposal would supplement but not supersede that prohibition. The United States believes that his proposal should receive serious study by this Committee.

109. I turn now to the second category of proposals on chemical and bacteriological weapons -- the proposals to ban the production and possession of such weapons. The plans for general and complete disarmament already submitted to this Committee contain proposals of that kind. Resolution 2162 B, to which I have already referred, notes that the Committee has before it -

"... the task of seeking an agreement on the cessation of the development and production of chemical and bacteriological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and on the elimination of all such weapons from national arsenals, as called for in the draft proposals on general and complete disarmament now before the Conference."

110. Mr. Mulley has proposed a ban on the production of microbiological agents and the destruction of any stocks of such agents or the ancillary equipment already in the possession of the parties. The United Kingdom working paper notes that this would have to be "so worded as to take account of the fact that most of the microbiological agents that could be used in hostilities are also needed for peaceful purposes." (ENDC/231, para.5) Mr. Mulley recognized that the greatest difficulty this proposal faces is the method of verification. He added:

"... parties to any arms control or disarmament agreement are entitled to be reasonably satisfied to the greatest practicable extent that other parties are carrying out their obligations under the agreement." (ENDC/PV.387, para.12)

111. We too recognize the serious problem that is posed by the need to verify a ban on the production and possession of microbiological agents. If Mr. Mulley's proposal for such a ban has wide support in principle, we would recommend that a working group be formed under the auspices of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to study this problem as well as other problems relating to such a ban, and that this group report at a later date. There is ample precedent here for a working group of this kind to deal

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with the whole range of technical problems which might arise. We believe that with such a report in hand the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament would be better equipped to address itself to the question of a convention or treaty banning the production, possession and use of microbiological agents for other than peaceful purposes. I noted Mr. Castañeda's suggestion today for a sub-committee to deal with this problem -- a suggestion which is quite similar to our idea.

112. I turn now to the third category of proposals which have been made -- those for studies by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the nature and possible effects of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Mr. Mulley proposed such a study for chemical weapons alone. The representative of Poland proposed such a study for both chemical and bacteriological weapons (ENDC/PV.385, para.70). On balance, we see some net gain in treating chemical weapons separately from bacteriological weapons. However, we can support a study on the nature and possible effects of chemical and bacteriological weapons, either together or separately.

113. We have a good precedent for such a study. The Canadian-Polish draft resolution of 1966, which became General Assembly resolution 2162 A (XXI) (ENDC/185), requested the Secretary-General to prepare a concise report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and the implications of their acquisition. The resulting report (A/6858) was of considerable benefit in the final stages of the negotiation of the non-proliferation treaty. To support such a study for chemical and bacteriological weapons is not to imply that the Geneva Protocol should be revised, superseded or supplemented. My own Government has made no decision on whether revision is required. But the world needs to be told of the nature of these weapons, and what their use might entail for mankind. The problems are of great complexity, yet the dangers are of mass devastation.

114. The least we can do is to begin to address ourselves to this problem at once. This Committee could play a significant role in initiating a study by the Secretary-General. We could recommend it to the General Assembly in our report. We could also draft suggested terms of reference for the experts to be selected by the Secretary-General. This Committee has never given careful study to chemical and bacteriological warfare. We have, therefore, much to learn. The time to begin is now.

115. Finally, may we again stress that this is not the forum for dealing with the difficult problem of bringing peace to Viet-Nam? I for one do not propose to complicate the difficult negotiations for peace going on in Paris by making statements here about that war.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 389th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador A.A. Roshchin, representative of the USSR.

"Statements were made by the representatives of India, Canada, Mexico, the Soviet Union and the United States.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 15 August 1968, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.